Thoughts on Comparable Worth Litigation and Organizational Strategies by Gertner, Nancy
University of Michigan Journal of Law Reform 
Volume 20
1986 
Thoughts on Comparable Worth Litigation and Organizational 
Strategies 
Nancy Gertner 
Silvergate, Gertner, Fine, Good & Mizner 
Follow this and additional works at: https://repository.law.umich.edu/mjlr 
 Part of the Civil Rights and Discrimination Commons, Labor and Employment Law Commons, Law and 
Gender Commons, and the Legislation Commons 
Recommended Citation 
Nancy Gertner, Thoughts on Comparable Worth Litigation and Organizational Strategies, 20 U. MICH. J. L. 
REFORM 163 (1986). 
Available at: https://repository.law.umich.edu/mjlr/vol20/iss1/5 
 
This Symposium Article is brought to you for free and open access by the University of Michigan Journal of Law 
Reform at University of Michigan Law School Scholarship Repository. It has been accepted for inclusion in 
University of Michigan Journal of Law Reform by an authorized editor of University of Michigan Law School 
Scholarship Repository. For more information, please contact mlaw.repository@umich.edu. 
THOUGHTS ON COMPARABLE 
WORTH LITIGATION AND 
ORGANIZATIONAL STRATEGIES 
Nancy Gertner* 
To watch the evolution of Title VIP is to watch the gradual 
constricting of a law that many had heralded as a tool of social 
change for women. 2 Its passage represented a statement that the 
so-called free market had not worked for women. Women were 
denied access to higher paying and high-status positions. Even 
when a job was integrated, women's work was undervalued and 
their wages frequently depressed. With the passage of Title VII 
came the hope that the law would do what the market could 
not-break the cycle of discrimination. 
Sex discrimination, in contrast with other forms of discrimina-
tion, seemed particularly intractable because it derived not only 
from overt discrimination, where the actor necessarily intended 
to harm women, but also from a wide range of more subtle poli-
cies, practices, and attitudes-employers who judged particular 
women by the average characteristics of the group, state laws 
that excluded women workers from certain jobs in the name of 
protection, and women, socialized to believe that certain jobs 
were appropriate for them, who excluded themselves from 
higher paying jobs. 3 
* Partner, Silvergate, Gertner, Fine, Good & Mizner, Boston, Massachusetts; Visiting 
Professor of Law, Harvard University (1985-1986). B.A., 1967, Barnard College; J.D., 
M.A., 1971, Yale University. 
This Article grew out of a talk I was asked to give on litigation and organizational 
strategies for securing pay equity. Others were asked to address conceptual issues and to 
summarize the state of the law. Although my task was more practical, I felt compelled to 
look very briefly at the larger picture-the evolution of the law of comparable 
worth-and the smaller picture, a case study of one broad-based complaint for pay eq-
uity in which I participated as counsel. 
1. 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e to 2000e-17 (1982). 
2. This is not to suggest that the framers of Title VII had this idea in mind. Indeed, 
the legislative history of Title VII could not have been more sketchy. See, e.g., Schlei, 
Foreword to B. ScHLEI & P. GROSSMAN, EMPLOYMENT DISCRIMINATION LAW at vii (2d ed. 
1983); see also Miller, Sex Discrimination and Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 
51 MINN. L. REV. 877, 880-82 (1967). 
3. See Gertner, Bakke on Affirmative Action for Women: Pedestal or Cage?, 14 HARV. 
C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 173, 182 ( 1979). See generally Freedman, Sex Equality, Sex Differ-
ences, and the Supreme Court, 92 YALE L.J. 913 (1983). 
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Title VII litigation initially focused on access to jobs and pro-
motional opportunities, in the hope of breaking down the barri-
ers to free competition with men for men's jobs. But it soon be-
came clear that equal access alone was not sufficient. 
Notwithstanding the gradual lowering of some of the most overt 
barriers, large numbers of women remained relegated to jobs 
completely segregated from male jobs-driven there by the same 
subtle and not so subtle mix of factors motivating discrimination 
in job access. And in these segregated cloisters women's work 
continued to be undervalued. More than equal opportunity and 
access to the men's jobs was needed, for the result of employ-
ment selection processes continued to be sex discrimination. 4 
Antidiscrimination law, however, had no theories for results. 
It had only theories of process. It was concerned with factors 
that allegedly distort decisionmaking about employment in a 
market setting otherwise presumed to be fair. Unequal results 
were significant only insofar as they reflected an impermissible 
process.11 As a litigator for plaintiffs, my job was to place compa-
rable worth claims in the framework of these extremely limited 
process theories. 
Efforts to situate comparable worth litigation within existing 
Title VII process theories, however, met with two persistent crit-
icisms. First, many sounded the theme of institutional compe-
tence,6 claiming that the courts lacked the competence to deal 
with this new cause of action. Although in "equal pay for equal 
work" claims, courts had a standard by which to judge women's 
work-the standard of the men's job-comparable worth claims 
seemed to open the door to a priori absolute measures of 
"worth" or "value." Second, and related, some feared that the 
comparable worth approach, by exposing all jobs to inquiry and 
by imposing external standards on employers, ran the risk of 
wholesale intervention in the marketplace.7 These criticisms im-
4. The pressure for affirmative action is an example. Equal opportunity and equal 
access were helpful, but did not address the fact that women were still socialized into 
certain jobs, that employers continued to stereotype women because of the patterns they 
observed, and that these patterns continually reinforced themselves. Affirmative action 
was necessary to break the cycle. 
5. See infra notes 10-16 and accompanying text. For a critique of the limitations of 
antidiscrimination theory, see Freeman, Legitimizing Racial Discrimination Through 
Antidiscrimination Law: A Critical Review of Supreme Court Doctrine, 62 MINN. L. REV. 
1049 (1978). 
6. See generally H. HART & A. SACKS, THE LEGAL PROCESS 3-4, 179-98 (tentative ed. 
1958). 
7. See AFSCME v. Washington, 770 F.2d 1401, 1407 (9th Cir. 1985) ("We find noth-
ing in the language of Title VII or its legislative history to indicate Congress intended to 
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ply that the theory of comparable worth parts company with the 
rest of antidiscrimination law. 
My goal as litigator was to demonstrate that comparable 
worth theories fell well within the tradition of antidiscrimination 
law, and that questions of institutional competence and impact 
on the market have been raised and rejected as against the more 
traditional theories, when they were applied to standard issues 
like hiring and firing. It was clear, however, that the approach 
suffered some realistic problems-some that mirrored difficulties 
found elsewhere in antidiscrimination law, and some that were 
unique to comparable worth claims. 8 Where an employer had no 
written job evaluation scheme for a court to assess and accept in 
whole or in part, even courts finding overt, intentional discrimi-
nation faced difficulties in fashioning appropriate remedies. Sec-
ond, some comparable worth claims seemed to raise substantial 
problems of proof, with perhaps the worst offenders-the least 
rational employers-subjected to the least scrutiny.9 Although 
these problems were not unusual in discrimination litigation, the 
fact that they seemed to pose more difficulty for courts in the 
wage claim arena than in any other was unusual. Third, compa-
rable worth claims-like many other claims in sex discrimina-
tion law-presented fundamental problems in defining the na-
ture of sex discrimination. 
abrogate fundamental economic principles such as the laws of supply and demand or to 
prevent employers from competing in the labor market."). 
8. The problems listed here are in addition to the general problems concerning the 
limitations of discrimination theory. See generally Freeman, supra note 5. 
9. One way of describing these problems is to categorize employers. The employer 
with no written companywide evaluation system, perhaps not even a set of written crite-
ria for setting wages, but with disparities between comparable men's and women's job 
rates, might pose two difficulties for plaintiffs. If plaintiffs can demonstrate discrimina-
tory animus of some sort in the wage-setting processes, they establish liability. But the 
problems described above in fashioning remedies persist. For a suggestion that these 
problems are not unsolvable, see infra text accompanying note 52. If the plaintiffs can-
not trace the "bad" results to overt, intentional discrimination or cannot otherwise iden-
tify the mechanism by which these results are achieved, the court may find that they 
have failed to make out even the minimal prima facie case standard. I suggest that such 
a result would be wrong in the light of Title VII case law for nonwage claims. See infra 
notes 24-27 and accompanying text. In effect, current case law suggests that the employ-
ers who have been least careful in fashioning objective written criteria in ad-
vance-whom I have described as the least rational employers-may be most successful 
in defending these cases. To be sure, however, such an employer takes a risk that the 
plaintiff will try to use the presence of subjective criteria, or shifting criteria coupled 
with adverse results, as circumstantial evidence of overt, intentional discrimination. 
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I. EXISTING PROCESS THEORIES OF WAGE DISCRIMINATION 
There are two overall theories of discrimination: (1) overt, in-
tentional discrimination, termed "disparate treatment," which 
either involves classification in terms of a particular trait that 
characterizes members of a protected group, or classification ex-
pressly in terms of membership in the protected group; and (2) 
neutral rule discrimination, termed "disparate impact," where 
the enforcement of an ostensibly neutral rule, seemingly unre-
lated to a particular group, has the net effect of discriminating 
against the group. 
In the case of intentional discrimination, the theory is that sex 
discrimination may not be the motivation for fixing wage rates 
any more than it can provide the basis for making other job de-
cisions, like promotion or hiring.10 The court is concerned with 
the result-unequal wage rates for men and women-only inso-
far as it is the starting point for the analysis of whether the wage 
differential derives from sex discrimination. 11 Bad results are 
important because they reflect an impermissible process. Im-
plicit in this is the view that the market will function appropri-
ately for women once we eliminate these isolated "glitches" of 
intentional sex discrimination. 
Likewise, in the disparate impact theory of discrimination, an 
employer may not select a criterion for employment or wage set-
ting that has a disproportionate adverse impact on women.12 
We, as a society, make the judgment that such wage-setting 
processes are impermissible. For the purpose of this analysis, it 
10. County of Washington v. Gunther, 452 U.S. 161 (1981), paved the way for this 
analysis. Prior to Gunther, if an employer used a wage determination that was transpar-
ently sex-biased, a woman could not challenge it unless she could prove that her job was 
equal to that of a man in the same establishment. 
11. The issue is not and never has been "culpable" intent, which was the position 
taken by the court in AFSCME v. Washington, 770 F.2d 1401 (9th Cir. 1985). Sex dis-
crimination has never been characterized by an express, overt intent to harm women. 
Indeed, sex discrimination was frequently characterized by the opposite-a beneficent, if 
not chivalrous, intent. See Gertner, supra note 3, at 182. The goal of sex discrimination 
litigation was to identify an impermissible motive, one that society would not permit as 
the basis of actions involving women employees. 
For example, courts have rejected "customer preference" as a defense to the failure of 
employers to hire women. See, e.g., Diaz v. Pan Am. World Airways, 442 F.2d 385 (5th 
Cir.), cert. denied, 404 U.S. 950 (1971); Fernandez v. Wynn Oil Co., 653 F.2d 1273 (9th 
Cir. 1981); Witt v. Secretary of Labor, 397 F. Supp. 673 (D. Me. 1975). The question in 
these cases was not whether the employer meant to treat women harshly; it plainly did 
not. Nor was the question whether the employer intended to treat individual women 
differently on account of their sex; it plainly did. The sole question was whether the 
court would permit such treatment. 
12. See Griggs v. Duke Power Co., 401 U.S. 424 (1971). 
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does not matter if the criterion at issue was one within the em-
ployer's control13-such as prior job experience or training re-
quirements-or was one beyond the employer's control-such as 
certain educational prerequisites14 or height and weight require-
ments. 111 Again, the result is less important than the mechanism 
by which it was effected. The law will not permit an employer to 
rely unnecessarily16 on characteristics not evenly distributed 
among males and females in the population, however beneficent 
his or her intent. 
Moreover, because sex discrimination masquerades as sex 
stereotyping, the distinction between disparate impact and dis-
parate treatment may not be so clear. The distinction between 
impact and treatment theories may mean nothing more than 
choosing job requirements that reflect the employer's image of 
the job-an image typically determined by the job's male incum-
bents.17 In this arena, again, the implication is that once specific 
impediments, such as the use of impermissible criteria, are re-
moved, women will function successfully in the market. 
Under each category, there are the "easy" cases-cases that 
should pose no problem for the courts, but in fact do. These are 
the cases in which there appears to be direct evidence of sex 
discrimination. 18 Today, however, few jobs are labelled "M" or 
"F"; sex discrimination is rarely that explicit. Although it may 
be easier to prove that a given employer focused his ire on a 
given woman, dismissing an entire class of people by simply de-
valuing their jobs comes about in far more subtle ways. 19 
13. See Gertner, supra note 3, at 198-200. 
14. See, e.g., Cuthbertson v. Biggers Bros., 702 F.2d 454 (4th Cir. 1983); Donnell v. 
General Motors Corp., 576 F.2d 1292 (8th Cir. 1978). 
15. See Dothard v. Rawlinson, 433 U.S. 321 (1977). 
16. The so-called "business necessity" defense was first framed by the Supreme 
Court in Griggs v. Duke Power Co., 401 U.S. 424 (1971). 
17. See infra note 19. 
18. In County of Washington v. Gunther, 452 U.S. 161 (1981), the plaintiffs alleged 
that the employer determined that their jobs should be paid 95% of the male wage rate 
for comparable jobs. In Fitzgerald v. Sirloin Stockade, 624 F.2d 945 (10th Cir. 1980), the 
plaintiff assumed most of the duties of the former director of her department after he 
left the job, but received no increase in pay. In International Union of Electrical, Radio 
& Machine Workers v. Westinghouse Electric Corp., 631 F.2d 1094 (3d Cir. 1980), cert. 
denied, 452 U.S. 967 (1981), the employer's manual instructed plant managers to depress 
wages for certain jobs solely because those jobs were held by women. 
19. The classic example, originally cited by Margaret Mead, is the fact that in some 
societies, men fish and women weave, and fishing is considered more important than 
weaving. In other societies, men weave and women fish, and weaving is considered more 
important than fishing. K. MILLE'IT, SEXUAL POLITICS 224 (1970) (citing Mead, Prehistory 
and the Woman, BARNARD C. BuLL., Apr. 30, 1969, at supp. 7); see also Blumrosen, Wage 
Discrimination, Job Segregation, and Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 12 
U. MICH. J.L. REF. 399, 417-19 (1979). 
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Without direct evidence of sex discrimination, the plaintiff 
proffers circumstantial evidence. 20 One can use statistical evi-
dence to buttress an individual claim of sex discrimination with 
respect to a single decision, or one can off er evidence of a pat-
tern and practice of discrimination in other arenas. One can de-
pose the decisionmakers, the salary evaluators, to determine 
their explanations and attempt to prove that those explanations 
are pretexts. Or one can trace other decisions those deci-
sionmakers have made that are discriminatory, which permit the 
inference of discrimination in the arena of wage setting as well. 21 
In instances of disparate impact discrimination, as with dispa-
rate treatment actions, there are the "easy" cases-ones in 
which the plaintiff can target the single mechanism by which the 
disparate impact is effected.22 One example is the situation in 
20. See McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792 (1973); see also Furnco 
Constr. Corp. v. Waters, 438 U.S. 567 (1978); Sweeney v. Board of Trustees of Keene 
State College, 604 F.2d 106 (1st Cir. 1979), cert. denied, 444 U.S. 1045 (1980). 
21. In one sense, this is an innovation of antidiscrimination law. Plaintiffs offer proof 
of the discriminatory animus of a decisionmaker in one employment area, whether in-
volving the plaintiffs or not, to create an inference of discrimination in the relevant em-
ployment area in which the plaintiff is involved. 
Winn Newman and Ruth Blumrosen have argued that a showing of intentional initial 
assignment discrimination, coupled with a showing that the jobs occupied by women are 
paid less than those occupied by men, should make out a prima facie case of intentional 
discrimination. In initial assignment discrimination, men and women, applying for entry-
level positions requiring minimal qualifications and having the same background, are 
assigned to different sex-segregated positions. According to Newman and Blumrosen, 
segregating the women in one department raises an inference of discrimination every bit 
as strong as racially segregating schools. A sexually separate job structure results in in-
ferior wages because the employer who believes that women should be excluded from 
certain jobs is likely to believe that the segregated jobs it permits women to perform 
have less value than those performed by men. 
If the men are earning more than equally qualified women because of an act of the 
employer, it is reasonable to shift the burden to the employer to prove that the content 
of the jobs justifies the rate. Initial assignment sex segregation, coupled with lower wages 
for the female jobs, according to Newman, fits within the category of "actions taken by 
the employer from which one can infer, if such actions remained unexplained, that it is 
more likely than not that such actions were based on a discriminatory criterion illegal 
under the Act." Newman & Vonhof, "Separate but Equal"-Job Segregation and Pay 
Equity in the Wake of Gunther, 1981 U. ILL. L. REV. 269, 288 n.91 (quoting Furnco 
Constr. Corp. v. Waters, 438 U.S. 567, 576 (1978)); see also Blumrosen, supra note 19. 
22. According to the Supreme Court in Franks v. Bowman Transportation Co., 424 
U.S. 747, 763 (1976), Title VII "prohibit[s) all practices in whatever form which create 
inequality in employment opportunity due to discrimination on the basis of race, reli-
gion, sex, or national origin." 
It should be noted that while Gunther clarified the law with respect to disparate treat-
ment, holding that even dissimilar jobs can be challenged where there is a showing of 
intentional discrimination, it muddied the law with respect to disparate impact. Justice 
Brennan's opinion suggested that the fourth affirmative defense of the Equal Pay Act, 29 
U.S.C. § 206(d)(l)(iv) (1982)-"any other factor other than sex"-now engrafted onto 
Title VII wage litigation, may well have been designed to confine the application of the 
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which an employer regularly pays a premium above established 
wage rates to certain employees, and this premium reflects sex 
stereotypes, such as a "head of household" premium or a pre-
mium for travelling on a regular basis. 23 
Both with respect to disparate impact and disparate treat-
ment, however, there are the "weakest" cases. But as I show be-
low, these cases may perhaps be the most important. These are 
the cases in which the results-wage differentials between men 
and women-are vastly disproportionate, but the plaintiff can 
neither trace these results to a specific discriminatory animus 
nor identify the mechanism by which the results are achieved. 
Because we have no theory to cover results-and indeed, we dis-
parage all such theories, 24-the fair employment laws cannot at-
tack the problem head on. The problem is typically character-
ized as a problem of proof-an insufficiency of evidence to show 
either discriminatory animus or a discriminatory mechanism. In 
a non-wage discrimination disparate treatment case, for exam-
ple, a situation may be presented where the plaintiff can offer 
nothing but general statistical evidence of discrimination in hir-
ing and proof of a specific adverse employment decision (such as 
that the plaintiff was qualified but not hired), but not any spe-
cific discriminatory conduct towards the plaintiff. Although 
under current law, such a suit would survive a directed verdict 
after the plaintiff's case, it may well not succeed on the merits. 211 
Act to wage differentials attributable to intentional sex discrimination. Although he did 
not say so expressly, his words can be interpreted to mean that practices "fair in form 
but discriminatory in operation" would not without a showing of intentionality fit within 
this standard. Some commentators have suggested, however, that this interpretation is 
not compelled by the phrase "any other factor other than sex." See Newman & Vonhof, 
supra note 21, at 277 n. 42. But see Spaulding v. University of Wash., 740 F.2d 686, 700-
01 (9th Cir.) (requiring plaintiffs to prove discriminatory intent), cert. denied, 469 U.S. 
1036 (1984). 
23. A larger proportion of men than women qualify as heads of households or are 
generally more available to travel regularly. Under the Equal Pay Act, a head of house-
hold differential is not a "factor other than sex." 29 C.F.R. § 800.149 (1986); see Neeley 
v. Metropolitan Atlanta Rapid Transit Auth., 24 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA) 1610 
(D. Ga. 1980) (finding that a prima facie case of wage discrimination existed where the 
employer had a written policy requiring special approval for salaries for new employees 
that exceeded by more than l0~i, the salaries at their last job). 
24. See Freeman, supra note 5. 
25. Cf. New York City Transit Auth. v. Beazer, 440 U.S. 568 (1979) (finding that 
statistics purporting to demonstrate that the exclusion of individuals who were receiving 
methadone treatment fell disproportionately on black or Hispanic employees were insuf-
ficient to establish intentional discrimination on the part of a public employer); Hudson 
v. International Business Machs. Corp., 620 F.2d 351 (2d Cir.) (finding that statistical 
evidence of discrimination is probative but not determinative in an individual discrimi-
nation claim), cert. denied, 449 U.S. 1066 (1980); King v. Yellow Freight Sys., 523 F.2d 
879 (8th Cir. 1975) (same). 
170 Journal of Law Reform [VOL. 20:l 
Likewise, there are the disparate impact cases in which the 
plaintiff offers evidence of a statistical disparity but cannot 
identify the particular mechanism to explain that disparity.26 
Commentators speculating about the comparable situation in a 
wage discrimination setting have suggested that, in contrast to 
"regular" Title VII cases, such an approach may not even sur-
vive a directed verdict at all. 27 
In the category of "hard" cases, there are instances where the 
plaintiff can identify the mechanism, where there is even an ex-
press justification for the wage policy in terms of women, but 
where courts do not characterize that mechanism or that justifi-
cation as discrimination. In AFSCME v. Washington, 28 for ex-
ample, the appellate court sustained the use of the prevailing 
market rate to value jobs even where it was alleged that the 
market discriminated against women. 
This kind of decision raises fundamental questions concerning 
the definition of sex discrimination. If the market does not value 
women's jobs in terms of the marginal productivity of women, as 
some economists would predict,29 but rather reflects the historic 
undervaluation of women's work, how can the market be used 
lawfully to set women's wages?30 Put otherwise, if the employer 
in AFSCME had been explicit about the impact of that policy 
on women, saying, in essence, "I value these jobs held princi-
pally by women at a low rate, because the market values them at 
that low rate" or, "I pay women this wage because I can get 
away with it; men would not tolerate it," the court could have 
26. Under the usual disparate impact scenario, the burden would shift to the em-
ployer both to offer an explanation for the disproportionate impact and to justify it 
under the business necessity standard. See supra note 16. 
27. See, e.g., Newman & Vonhof, supra note 21, at 290. There is an interesting his-
torical parallel here. Just as the courts seem to be more strict with wage claims than with 
other Title VII claims, so the courts in the early 1920's differentiated between laws regu-
lating women's hours, which they held to be appropriate, and laws regulating women's 
wages, which they initially invalidated. Compare Muller v. Oregon, 208 U.S. 412 (1908) 
(upholding state's power to regulate women's hours) with Adkins v. Children's Hosp., 
261 U.S. 525 (1923) (invalidating a congressional attempt to fix minimum wage standards 
for adult women), overruled, West Coast Hotel Co. v. Parrish, 300 U.S. 379 (1937) (up-
holding state's establishment of minimum wages for women). Comparable worth claims, 
like the laws regulating minimum wages, may initially be viewed with skepticism by 
some courts, because they appear to be price-fixing-anathema to the free market 
system. 
28. 770 F.2d 1401 (9th Cir. 1985). 
29. For a general outline of the neoclassical economics model, see M. GOLD, A DIA· 
LOGUE ON COMPARABLE WORTH 17-20 (1983). 
30. See generally COMMITTEE ON OCCUPATIONAL CLASSIFICATION AND ANALYSIS, NA-
TIONAL RESEARCH COUNCIL, WOMEN, WORK, AND WAGES (1981). 
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labelled that conduct as overt sex discrimination. In effect, the 
market is communicating the very same messages.31 
II. THE PROBLEM AREAS 
There are generally three problem areas in litigating sex dis-
crimination claims. First, even in the "easy" disparate treatment 
cases, where the plaintiff has proved either through direct or cir-
cumstantial evidence that there was discriminatory intent, rem-
edy remains a problem. Where the employer has no single evalu-
ation plan governing all jobs, indeed, no explicit formula, the 
court must come up with a measure of the job's worth.32 In other 
Title VII discrimination settings, the court makes a "thumbs 
up" or "thumbs down" determination as to whether the woman 
gets the job from which she was excluded because of discrimina-
tion. In an "equal pay for equal work" situation, there is a clear 
measure; whatever the men were paid the women will be paid. 
The standard critique is that the court lacks competence to 
arrive at a fair measure. 33 Critics argue that if the court adopts a 
market measure, it may be reifying the existing discriminatory 
31. The policy question is made explicit when the employer is to present his defense 
to a disparate treatment or disparate impact claim. Where the plaintiff presents a prima 
facie case of discrimination, the employer must come forward with "legitimate nondis-
criminatory reasons" for the treatment of the plaintiff or plaintiffs. In a wage discrimina-
tion case, the reasons must fit within one of the four affirmative defenses of the Equal 
Pay Act. At this point, the court must determine whether or not the "market" appropri-
ately fits into the Equal Pay Act categories, and in particular, the category "any other 
factor other than sex." 
In disparate impact cases, the court must address the policy question when the plain-
tiff has isolated the mechanism responsible for the disparate impact, and if that mecha-
nism is the market. Alternatively, the question will arise when the plaintiff has shown 
that the employer's policies effect a disproportionate adverse impact on women, and the 
employer comes forward with an explanation for the disproportionate impact and with 
the claim that the mechanism is the market. For the purpose of this analysis, I do not 
address the question of whether or not County of Washington v. Gunther, 452 U.S. 161 
(1981), requires shifting the burden of proof as to the four affirmative defenses under the 
Equal Pay Act, or whether the procedural standard of Texas Department of Community 
Affairs v. Burdine, 450 U.S. 248 (1981), in which only the burden of going forward is 
shifted, should apply. 
32. In contrast, if the employer has a single evaluation system, and the plaintiff can 
show discriminatory treatment in its application to women, i.e., that women's jobs are 
rated at a percentage of the men's jobs, or the plaintiff can show disparate impact be-
cause of the play of one factor or another, the remedy consists of excising the offending 
factor and i:ecalculating the wage. The fact that the starting point of analysis is the em-
ployer's evaluation of the jobs limits the court's task and avoids the problem of using 
outside evaluators or engaging in a war of experts. 
33. See supra text accompanying note 6. 
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pattern.34 If it calls for experts to use a priori methods of evalu-
ation,3~ it will be lost in a battle of experts, lacking the expertise 
itself to determine which is the better measure. Explicit in the 
AFSCME decision was the familiar concern of comparable worth 
critics that disparaging the market as a justification for wage 
setting would lead to wholesale judicial intervention in the mar-
ketplace, with judges second-guessing employers. 
Second, similar issues are raised in a disparate impact situa-
tion, where the plaintiff has identified the mechanism of dis-
crimination as the act of setting women's wages according to the 
prevailing wage rate; or in a disparate treatment claim, where 
the employer's defense is that the market qualifies as a "factor 
other than sex." 
In AFSCME, the court characterized the claim that the mar-
ket has a disproportionate impact on women as too diffuse; the 
plaintiff had to identify the mechanism with greater precision. 36 
At the same time, relying on the Supreme Court's decision in 
Personnel Administrator v. Feeney,37 the court concluded that 
disparate treatment was not proved by showing the defendant's 
implementation of a market-based wage system, even knowing 
its adverse impact on women. 
But the court's position was disingenuous. The issue is not 
whether the plaintiff identified the measure with sufficient preci-
sion or proved intentional discrimination. Ultimately, the issue 
is whether the court approves of the formula on which the em-
ployer has relied. The plan in question in Feeney, a veterans' 
preference plan, like the market formula in AFSCME, was a 
plan that the court felt was justified notwithstanding its adverse 
impact on women. In contrast, not hiring a woman because of 
"customer preference," or using a "head of household" pre-
mium-whether cast as disparate impact or disparate treat-
ment-are formulae of which the courts disapprove. The ques-
tion is fundamental: Will society permit the market formula to 
be used where its impact is skewed against women?38 
Third, problems arise in what I have already described as the 
"hard" cases-where there are significant results that appear 
34. But see infra notes 41-46 and accompanying text. 
35. See M. GoLD, supra note 29, at 41-43. 
36. According to the court, disparate impact analysis is "confined to cases which 
challenge a specific clearly delineated employment practice applied at a single point in 
the job selection process." AFSCME v. Washington, 770 F.2d 1401, 1405 (9th Cir. 1985). 
37, 442 U.S. 256 (1979). 
38. See City of Los Angeles Dep't of Water & Power v. Manhart, 435 U.S. 702 (1978); 
see also cases cited supra note 11. 
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discriminatory, that is, men's wages are substantially higher 
than women's wages, but because the employer has no single 
evaluation system, or no explicit evaluation system, the plaintiff 
can neither identify the mechanism for a disparate impact argu-
ment nor prove discriminatory intent beyond what inferences 
might be drawn from the statistics. 
This is the case to which most of the critics' ire is directed. 
This is the case in which it is suggested that the plaintiffs are 
trying to show that the disparities between men's wages and 
women's wages are out of proportion to the differences in the 
jobs-or the forbidden results argument again. This is the arena 
where the critics-underscoring the limits of institutional com-
petence, and warning against wholesale interventions in the 
market-are at their loudest. The court, it is argued, has no way 
of determining whether the disparities between job and salary 
are "appropriate." Moreover, the theory is not self-limiting; any 
two jobs held predominately by men and women may be com-
pared, raising the specter of wreaking havoc with the market-
place.39 
If this is "all" that the plaintiff has, most defendants will 
move to dismiss on the ground that this is a "results theory" of 
wage discrimination not contemplated by Gunther. A motion to 
dismiss, however, is the wrong approach. The claim properly 
raises questions of proof, such as whether the evidence is suffi-
cient to show discriminatory intent or disparate impact, and not 
preliminary questions of theory. To weed out the claim at the 
preliminary pleading stage is to carve out ab initio the category 
of employer that most requires scrutiny. This is the employer 
who has eschewed a single objective evaluation system, and 
whose wage-setting system is so subjective that the employee 
cannot identify the mechanism by which discrimination is ac-
complished. 40 Whether these cases will ultimately be successful 
is, of course, another matter. 
39. Even multiple regression analysis does not address these claims. To apply multi-
ple regression analysis, the plaintiff must identify the factors likely to have been the 
basis for the employer's decision. The statistician could derive those factors from the 
employer's explanation of his wage-setting policy. Next, the statistician could determine 
if these reasons were true or mere pretext. If the plaintiff can prove that the employer's 
proffered reasons do not account for the disparity between men's and women's wages, 
the question of remedy remains: What should be substituted for the employer's 
measure? 
40. In Title VII litigation generally, an employer who offers subjective post hoc ex-
planations for a particular employment practice runs the risks of not being believed by 
the fact finder or of the fact finder rejecting such explanations as inadequate to rebut a 
showing of disparate impact or disparate treatment. In wage discrimination claims, there 
is a chance that such an employer may well escape scrutiny altogether. 
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III. INSTITUTIONAL COMPETENCE AND IMPACT ON THE MARKET 
Under the Equal Pay Act, it was not sufficient to justify pay-
ing women lower wages for equal work by pointing to the pre-
vailing wages in the market. The market did not qualify as a 
"factor other than sex. "n 
Moreover, if it is the case that the raison d'etre for Title VII 
was that the market was not adequately valuing women's work, 
that it mirrored sex stereotypes and continued to reflect historic 
attitudes towards women's work,42 then relying on market fac-
tors means simply reifying these existing patterns. Curiously 
enough, in other non-wage discrimination settings, courts have 
had no problem identifying this vicious cycle. For instance, from 
the outset of Title VII litigation, courts have rejected the view 
that "customer preference" could justify hiring members of one 
sex or another.43 Customer preference, after all, simply reflected 
societal sex discrimination. Moreover, customer preference is 
one factor responsible for market discrimination against women. 
Nor is it the case that the "market factors" argument can be 
distinguished from other justifications because this factor impli-
cates something over which the employer has no control.44 
Griggs v. Duke Power Co.,411 which pioneered the disparate im-
pact approach, involved an employer making decisions on the 
basis of societal factors beyond his control (high school diplo-
mas), the net effect of which was discrimination against blacks. 
Finally, the suggestion that comparable worth-type wage dis-
crimination claims will wreak havoc in the market is overstated. 
It is not the case that "market factors" justify a specific wage, 
that there is some paradigmatic scale that the market neces-
sarily reflects. Frequently, the market offers a range of wages. 
Moreover, it is difficult to imagine large private or public em-
ployers enslaved by the prevailing market rates. What is more 
41. Corning Glass Works v. Brennan, 417 U.S. 188, 204-05 (1974); Hodgson v. Brook-
haven Gen. Hosp., 436 F.2d 719, 726 (5th Cir. 1970). 
In contrast, the court in Christensen v. Iowa, 563 F.2d 353, 356 (8th Cir. 1977), permit-
ted wage discrimination on the basis of market factors under Title VII. Two judges held 
that a university's practice of paying men at a rate higher than the evaluated worth of 
their jobs, while paying women at the evaluated worth of their jobs, did not violate Title 
VII because Title VII permitted wage discrimination on the basis of market factors. The 
court conceded a different result under the Equal Pay Act per Gunther. Id. at 356 n.7. 
42. See M. GoLD, supra note 29, at 21-22. 
43. See cases cited supra note 11. 
44. See Gertner, supra note 3. 
45. 401 U.S. 424 (1971). 
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likely is that they control the market rates by the wages they 
assign.46 
Nor is it the case that these theories will necessarily lead to 
massive intervention in the wage market or wholesale interfer-
ence with an employer's prerogatives. As already noted, the 
problem with disparate treatment cases, where the employer has 
no single evaluation plan or explicit set of criteria defining 
wages, is a problem of remedy. Likewise, there will be remedy 
problems with disparate impact theories, should these claims 
survive. Neither remedy problem, however, is insurmountable.47 
As long as the court permits disparate treatment claims, at 
minimum all jobs in an employer's plant are subject to scrutiny 
in terms of the means by which wage rates are set. The universe 
of jobs reviewed is not restricted by the "equal pay for equal 
work" standard. Moreover, all of Title VII to some extent suffers. 
from the same disability. When the court has to decide whether 
the reasons advanced by an employer are pretexts-what was 
the real reason for the action-or review recruitment, job selec-
tion, job assignment, promotion, or fringe benefits, it is necessa-
rily interfering with management prerogatives. 
The argument that courts are not competent to address these 
issues-particularly in the case of the "worst employer" scena-
rio, where the allegedly discriminating employer has no single 
evaluation system or even an explicit system-has been chal-
lenged with varying degrees of success.48 Winn Newman notes 
that third-party resolution of wage inequities involving dissimi-
lar jobs is "old hat" to the industrial relations world, and even to 
the judicial sector.49 The techniques have been developed by the 
1946 War Labor Board, by labor arbitrators, and, within certain 
limits, by courts articulating the "equal pay for equal work" 
standard of the Equal Pay Act.110 It is surely the case that courts 
are now required to make comparable subjective decisions. 
46. This analysis is derived from Weiler, The Wages of Sex: The Uses and Limits of 
Comparable Worth, 99 HARV. L. REV. 1728, 1761 (1986). 
47. See infra text accompanying notes 48-52. 
48. This is a variant of an old argument in sex discrimination law. In the pregnancy 
discrimination cases, the implication was that while courts could easily look at men and 
women to determine the ways in which they are the same, to acknowledge differences 
and determine the significance that those differences are to receive is outside the compe-
tence of the court. See, e.g., General Elec. Co. v. Gilbert, 429 U.S. 125 (1976). 
49. Newman & Vonhof, supra note 21, at 271. 
50. Id. at 271-72. 
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Under the pretext analysis, for example, they must determine 
difficult questions of human motivation.51 
In any case, recent commentary suggests that there is an ap-
proach to evaluating jobs that uses the standard discrimination 
approach. Rather than picking between a priori job values, the 
court can look to predominately men's jobs within a given plant 
to rank the way in which that employer values different tasks 
within the framework of the men's jobs alone. Once a job point 
system is discerned in the men's wages, the same can be applied 
to women's work.52 
Although it is surely the case that the "easiest" value for the 
court to assign to a job is the market value, such a process will 
necessarily perpetuate the existing pattern. To the extent that 
women have not been part of the market as a result of historic 
discrimination, sex stereotyping, the residual impact of protec-
tive labor legislation, socialization, and inchoate discrimination, 
society must make a choice. Some disruption is the price for 
eliminating the vestiges of sex discrimination. 
IV. ORGANIZATIONAL STRATEGIES 
It should be clear that litigation alone is insufficient to redress 
the problem of wage discrimination. If disparate treatment anal-
ysis is rejected, the remaining theory cannot begin to address 
the subtle forms of wage discrimination. Moreover, the institu-
tional competence and market arguments, if accepted by courts 
without limitation, will effectively limit disparate treatment 
claims as well. Plaintiffs' counsel must develop organizational 
strategies both in tandem with litigation and, as will be dis-
cussed, as part of a long-term strategy. 
Collective bargaining must be a focus of attention. There is no 
question that unions are accepted as ongoing actors in the mar-
ketplace; plaintiffs in Title VII litigation, apparently, are not. 
Whereas courts fear major incursions into the market from com-
parable worth claims, they have no such fear when unions bar-
gain, arbitrate, or even strike over comparable worth. 53 
Moreover, unions in major industries and unions of public em-
ployees have a unique power to effect pay equity. Arguments 
51. In other areas, lay decisionmakers are called upon to place a value on human life, 
as in jury trials of wrongful death cases. 
52. See Weiler, supra note 46, at 1768. 
53. See, e.g., Wisniewski, Achieving Equal Pay for Comparable Worth through Arbi-
tration, 8 EMPLOYEE REL. L.J. 236 (1982). 
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about the mythical market determining this or that prevailing 
wage wax thin where the subject of the discussion is a market 
leader. The ability of unions to achieve comparable worth in 
these arenas can have a ripple effect across the market. 114 Indeed, 
where public employers are concerned, workers can lobby as citi-
zens to effectuate comparable worth plans, for the same reasons. 
The State of Washington is one such example. 66 
This strategy is crucial, particularly where a limited percent-
age of American industry is organized and where women are 
largely clustered in the unorganized sectors. Strategies aimed at 
affecting wages in the organized sector of private industry, along 
with strategies aimed at affecting wages in the public sector, 
may well have an impact on the market price for women's work. 
In the arenas where collective bargaining takes place, the fo-
cus can be on bargaining directly or indirectly for comparable 
worth. Obviously, the parties can adopt the practice of setting 
wages according to comparable worth principles. Alternatively, 
they can bargain for a single, rational wage evaluation plan. As 
previously noted, 66 the absence of such a plan makes a crucial 
difference in litigation-posing remedy problems in some cases, 
undermining the proof in others. 67 
There can be no doubt that unions and management have the 
competence to bargain about these issues. Indeed, the more that 
wage issues are litigated in the forum where they have been ad-
dressed in the past-wage arbitration-the more job evaluation 
skills are refined and are then perhaps translatable in a Title 
VII setting. 
54. See supra text accompanying note 46. 
55. In the early 1970's, the State of Washington hired a consultant to perform a com-
prehensive evaluation of its wage structure. The consultant reported that distinctively 
"female" jobs were paid 20~;, less on the average than comparably valued "male" jobs. N. 
WILLIS & Assocs., STATE OF WASHINGTON COMPARABLE WoRTH STUDY (1974). Then-Gov-
ernor Dan Evans included in his proposed budget some money to remedy the identified 
disparities. Governor Evans' successor, Dixie Lee Ray, however, removed that item from 
the state budget, and what had begun as a political solution wound up in litigation in 
AFSCME v. Washington, 770 F.2d 1401 (9th Cir. 1985). 
56. See supra notes 32-35 and accompanying text. 
57. Bargaining for the principle of comparable worth or for a single evaluation plan 
arguably falls within the mandatory subjects of bargaining. Cf. NLRB v. Wooster Div. of 
Borg-Warner Corp., 356 U.S. 342, 349 (1958) (distinguishing mandatory subjects from 
matters that parties are not obligated to bargain over). A union's failure to bargain on 
this subject on behalf of its female employees arguably violates the duty of fair represen-
tation. See, e.g., Local Union No. 12, United Rubber, Cork, Linoleum & Plastic Workers 
v. NLRB, 368 F.2d 12 (5th Cir. 1966) (finding that the NLRB had jurisdiction over an 
unfair labor practice claim alleging a violation of the duty of fair representation in the 
union's discriminatory failure to file a grievance on behalf of its black members), cert. 
denied, 389 U.S. 837 (1967). 
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I would make these suggestions even if comparable worth liti-
gation were not under fire. Title VII litigation is too costly and 
too lengthy a process to provide continuing pressure on an em-
ployer to effect pay equity. Only ongoing organizational pres-
sure, coupled with the threat of Title VII litigation, will yield 
consistent results. 
V. A CASE STUDY: Krikorian v. General Electric Co. 
In 1978, Local 201 of the International Union of Electrical 
Workers (IUE), brought an omnibus action against the General 
Electric Company (GE) for sex discrimination in hiring, initial 
assignment, and wage setting. Local 201 and the IUE had filed 
the action in response to a consent decree that had been entered 
into by GE and the Equal Employment Opportunity Commis-
sion, which the union and the International found to be woefully 
inadequate. 118 
Although the IUE had a strong record on civil rights enforce-
ment,119 GE challenged the standing of the local to represent its 
women members. According to the company, in the event of a 
finding of discrimination, Local 201 would be held equally liable 
for any discrimination found by the court. In response to the 
challenge to Local 201 's standing, I entered an appearance on 
behalf of the class of all women in the Local 201 bargaining unit 
who worked in the four associated plants.60 
Two bargaining units were involved. The Riverworks and Ev-
erett plants produced steam turbines and aircraft engines pri-
marily under defense contracts. The Wilmington and West Lynn 
plants produced light machinery. The sex discrimination prob-
lem, however, was not only intraplant; significant interplant sex 
segregation was evident as well. 
At the time I entered the suit, approximately forty percent of 
the workers in the Wilmington and West Lynn plants were 
58. Brown v. General Elec. Co., 8 Lab. Rel. Rep. (BNA) 431:53 (EEOC Charge No. 
TNP 4C-2000, June 15, 1978). 
59. The IUE's general counsel for many years was Winn Newman. Newman was a 
crucial force behind the IUE's efforts to bring about pay equity in the electrical industry. 
He has been counsel of record or amicus in the major litigation concerning these issues, 
and has written and spoken extensively on comparable worth. 
60. That action was entitled Krikorian v. General Electric Co., and it proceeded in 
tandem with Local 201 v. General Electric Co. 
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women.61 Only sixteen percent of the 166 blue collar classifica-
tions were integrated by sex. Of the remaining jobs, one-half em-
ployed women workers almost exclusively, while the others em-
ployed only men. The "women's jobs" were all the lower rated 
jobs. Moreover, the women's jobs of assembly and machine oper-
ator were five to nine ratings below similar semiskilled jobs in 
Riverworks and Everett, which were overwhelmingly male. 
In Riverworks and Everett, ninety-one percent of blue collar 
workers were men. Women were represented, if at all, in only 
one-third of 172 blue collar classifications, and again, only in the 
lower rated jobs. 
This pattern of interplant job segregation derived from initial 
assignment discrimination, reinforced by a policy that did not 
permit transfers between the bargaining units. Intraplant job 
segregation also had its genesis in initial assignment discrimina-
tion, reinforced by a system of promotion through job families. 62 
The Riverworks and Everett jobs were clearly more lucrative 
for the company, and more important for the union as well. 
Eighty percent of the union membership was male, largely clus-
tered at these plants. The two plants with the largest percentage 
of women had not played a powerful role in the local union po-
litical structure.63 As a result, before the lawsuit, there had been 
little pressure to force GE to change the conditions at the Wil-
mington and West Lynn plants. There were numerous examples 
of the different treatment that women in these two plants re-
ceived, as contrasted with the workers in the predominately 
male plants. Training opportunities were substantially more ex-
tensive at Riverworks and Everett. The union had bargained for 
a wider range of protections for job security, and for promotion 
incentives within the Riverworks and Everett plants-job post-
ing, layoff and transfer supplements-with nothing comparable 
at Wilmington or West Lynn. 
The political issues that formed the centerpiece of this litiga-
tion came to a head when women workers in the Riverworks 
plant precipitated a strike over the rating assigned a "women's 
job" known as "prep to braze." Prep to braze is rated R 12 (day 
61. See Hams, Women Taking Leadership in Male-Dominated Locals, 8 WOMEN'S 
RTs. L. REP. 71, 72 (1984). Hams' statistics derive from status reports supplied to the 
union by the company during the course of various negotiating sessions. 
Because part of my strategy was to work with the women to bolster their political role 
in the union, and because Ms. Hams was my chief liaison, I believe that a description of 
internal union politics from her unique vantage point is more valuable than my own. I 
can only describe what I tried to do. She has described what actually occurred. 
62. See id. at 72. 
63. See id. at 75. 
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work) in Riverworks and IR 12 (piecework) in Everett. It was 
alleged that the rating was five ratings below some male jobs re-
quiring comparable skill and effort. The strike provided the first 
impetus for negotiations in the Krikorian suit. 
The new militancy of the women in the "prep to braze" job 
coincided with two other political developments within the 
union organization: the growth of the union organization at the 
Wilmington plant84 and the creation of the Women's Committee 
of Local 201. The latter is described as follows: 
Over a period of years [beginning in 1976], the 
[Women's] Committee developed from an ad hoc group 
into a permanent fifteen member elected body of the lo-
cal, over the opposition of much of the local's leadership. 
The Women's Committee struggle for recognition was 
won with the outspoken support of male and female 
union activists who believed in women's rights and 
wanted to see more rank and file participation in the 
union structure. Ironically, the Krikorian suit was being 
filed by the leadership during this same period-women's 
grievances had brought about this suit-yet women's 
leadership in the union was still a controversial and 
threatening issue. 811 
I entered the case in 1979, shortly after the prep to braze 
strike had been settled and the first round of conciliation talks 
was underway. I had several goals. Looking at the case from the 
point of view of a litigator, it was a substantial claim. In particu-
lar, the jobs in Wilmington and West Lynn could be traced to 
jobs labelled "M" or "W" by the company during World War IL 
Indeed, during this time the GE rate structure had been investi-
gated by the War Labor Board and found to have been discrimi-
natory. The War Labor Board had found that GE reduced the 
point values for women's jobs by thirty-three percent, after they 
had been evaluated on the same point scale as the men's. When 
the company merged the "M" and the "W" jobs, they put the 
women's jobs on the bottom. It was a classic case of disparate 
treatment. For other jobs, particularly those in the newer "male" 
plants, the litigation was bound to be more difficult. 
At the same time, it was clear to me that "winning" in the 
context of this litigation had to mean more than another consent 
64. See id. at 78. 
65. Id. 
FALL 1986) Organizational Strategies 181 
decree or even a judicial finding of discrimination. For the 
women to secure their gains over the long run, they had to par-
ticipate more effectively in the union. As a result, my assistant, 
Sharon Beckman, 66 and I met regularly with the plaintiffs and 
the Women's Committee of the local. We encouraged the women 
to bring to the table all of the issues that had been of concern to 
them, and not simply the issues that their male leadership had 
flagged. We attempted to publicize the efforts of the Women's 
Committee in our dealings with our own clients, underscoring 
the importance of the Women's Committee as a vehicle for ex-
pressing their concerns. Finally, we made it clear to both the 
union and the company that as the plaintiffs' counsel our con-
stituency was the women members of the union, and that we 
would not settle unless they approved. We had the power to 
block a settlement, and we would exercise that power. Because 
the litigation was important to the union and its leadership, this 
position gave the women additional leverage in their dealings 
with their own organization.67 
Finally, in October 1982, the Krikorian and Local 201 actions 
were settled. 68 Wage rates for 353 employees at Wilmington and 
West Lynn were increased. At the same time, provisions were 
added to increase intraplant movement to higher wage and 
higher status positions. Employees at Wilmington and West 
Lynn finally received the same protections from GE as their 
counterparts in Riverworks and Everett-i.e., layoff and transfer 
local agreements, job posting and upgrading local agreements, 
secondary job posting agreements, and agreements to prevent 
abuse of temporary assignments. The company opened training 
programs for a wide variety of positions not only at Riverworks 
and Everett, but also at Wilmington and West Lynn. The terms 
of the training programs were changed to make them more at-
tractive to women employees. Provisions were added for mater-
nity benefits and child care leaves at all plants. In addition, the 
company was required to make initial assignment to job posi-
tions according to a set formula. Finally, the company gave back 
pay awards to the individual plaintiffs, and to some retired 
members of the class who would be unable to enjoy the benefit 
of the new policies. 
66. Ms. Beckman had been hired specifically to work on the Krikorian litigation. 
67. See Hams, supra note 61, at 79. 
68. Krikorian v. General Elec. Co., No. 78-1444-Mc (D. Mass. Oct. 1982). It is beyond 
the scope of this Article to discuss the advantages and disadvantages of the settlement. 
For a critical discussion of the settlement, see Hams, supra note 61, at 81. 
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Our role, however, did not end with the settlement of the liti-
gation. We asked the Women's Committee to monitor the settle-
ment and to report back to us periodically. They have continued 
to do so, bringing us up to date on the company's compliance 
with all of the provisions. Some of the members of the Women's 
Committee have secured leadership positions in the union. The 
Committee has a regular column in the union newspaper and 
remains highly visible. We were simply one of many catalysts. 
CONCLUSION 
As the courts constrict the available comparable worth theo-
ries under Title VII, harping on concerns about institutional 
competence and the marketplace, attention must be directed to-
wards the organizational strategies described above. Women 
must look in part to unions, whose role in the market is clear 
and whose competence in this area is undenied. They must look 
to public employers and public officials in their capacity as citi-
zens. Litigation may play a part; it cannot be the whole picture. 
